Revision History — World Law
v0.2
The revision replaces the inaccurate cross-reference to Article 3.1 with a standalone rule for state attribution, direction, effective control, knowing substantial assistance, and a limited prevention duty. It narrows the substantive prohibition to three defined categories of widespread or systematic civilian harm; supplies definitions, causation requirements, and mental elements; and protects lawful expression, association, journalism, research, humanitarian work, and rights-compliant civil administration. It also establishes jurisdictional links, a competent forum, procedural guarantees, standards of proof, corporate-liability conditions, remedies, emergency interim measures, and review requirements. Article 3.7 is concurrently revised so that final Article 3.6 findings trigger proportionate, time-limited, reviewable non-kinetic enforcement.
What this version changed
Article 0.2
This instrument is designated World Law v0.1. It enters into force on the date certified by the Ratification Council under Article 13.3. Its designation as v0.1 signals that it is a living instrument subject to mandatory re-audit under Chapter 17.
This instrument is designated World Law v0.2. It enters into force on the date certified by the Ratification Council under Article 13.3. Its designation as v0.2 signals that it is a living instrument subject to mandatory re-audit under Chapter 17.
Article 3.6
## Article 3.6 — Prohibition on Weaponisation of AI Against Populations
No state or non-state actor may deploy AI systems as instruments of mass civilian harm, including: AI-directed autonomous weapons selecting civilian targets, AI-enabled mass surveillance used for persecution of persons on the basis of their identity, beliefs, or associations, or AI-generated information operations designed and deployed with the intent to incite mass violence against identified groups. 'Designed and deployed with intent' requires evidence of purposive direction, not merely foreseeable effect. Detailed provisions appear in Chapter 5.
## Article 3.6 — Prohibition on Weaponisation of AI Against Civilian Populations
1. No member state, person, or legal entity subject to this Article's jurisdiction may deploy an AI system to commit, materially facilitate, or knowingly assist a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. For this Article:
(a) "AI system" means a machine-based system that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers from inputs how to generate predictions, content, recommendations, decisions, or actions capable of influencing physical or virtual environments;
(b) "deploy" means to activate, operate, place into operational service, or exercise substantial operational control over an AI system. It does not include good-faith research, testing in a suitably controlled environment, publication, or provision of general-purpose tools absent the material contribution and mental element required by this Article;
(c) "civilian" means a person who is not directly participating in hostilities at the relevant time;
(d) "widespread or systematic attack" means a course of conduct involving multiple acts directed against civilians pursuant to or in furtherance of an organisational or state policy, and causing or creating a substantial and demonstrable risk of death, serious bodily or mental harm, severe deprivation of liberty, forced displacement, or persecution on a large scale; and
(e) "persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of a person's or group's identity, beliefs, associations, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sex, gender, disability, political opinion, or other comparable status.
2. The prohibited conduct under paragraph 1 is limited to the following categories:
(a) deploying an AI-enabled weapon system to select or engage civilian persons or civilian objects as targets, where the actor intends that result, knows that the system will produce that result, or consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the system will do so as part of a widespread or systematic attack;
(b) deploying AI-enabled surveillance, identification, classification, tracking, or decision systems to facilitate persecution as part of a widespread or systematic attack, where the actor intends, knows, or consciously disregards the substantial and unjustifiable risk of that use; or
(c) designing, deploying, financing, materially distributing, or exercising operational control over an AI-generated information operation that materially contributes to a substantial and demonstrable risk of imminent widespread or systematic violence against civilians or an identifiable civilian group, where the actor intends that violence, knows that the operation will materially contribute to it, or consciously disregards that risk.
3. For paragraph 2(c), a material contribution requires conduct that substantially enables, amplifies, coordinates, or directs the relevant operation. Liability shall not rest solely on political disagreement, generalized predictions of social harm, the mere creation of general-purpose technology, or a failure to foresee an unlawful use. "Consciously disregards" requires actual awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk; negligence alone is insufficient.
4. Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to prohibit or penalise lawful journalism, academic research, artistic expression, peaceful advocacy, political association, privacy-preserving services, humanitarian activity, or rights-compliant public administration solely because such activity uses or concerns AI. This safeguard does not exempt conduct meeting all elements of paragraph 2.
5. This Article binds:
(a) member states and their organs, armed forces, agencies, and officials;
(b) non-state armed groups and their members;
(c) private military or security companies, corporations, contractors, and their personnel; and
(d) natural or legal persons acting independently,
where the person or entity is within the jurisdiction described in paragraph 6. The legal or political status of an armed group does not remove responsibility under this Article, but does not displace applicable rules concerning jurisdiction, immunities, or due process.
6. The World Court may exercise jurisdiction under this Article over a natural or legal person where one or more of the following applies: the person is a national, habitual resident, incorporated entity, or entity with its principal place of business in a member state; the relevant conduct occurred in the territory of a member state; the AI system was deployed against civilians in the territory of a member state; or a member state exercises effective control over the person or entity. Member states shall provide for equivalent domestic jurisdiction over persons and legal entities meeting those criteria.
7. A member state bears responsibility for conduct prohibited by this Article when:
(a) the conduct is committed by its organs, armed forces, agents, or persons acting on its instructions;
(b) the state directs or exercises effective control over the specific prohibited conduct; or
(c) the state knowingly provides substantial assistance, financing, intelligence, operational support, or other material aid that materially contributes to the prohibited conduct, with knowledge of the conduct and of the circumstances establishing its prohibited character under this Article.
A contract, licence, regulatory approval, commercial relationship, funding arrangement, or informal contact, without the knowledge and substantial-contribution requirements in this paragraph, does not by itself establish state responsibility. A member state that has actual knowledge, or information it cannot reasonably disregard, of an imminent violation by a person subject to its jurisdiction shall take reasonable and proportionate measures within its lawful power to prevent or stop that violation. This preventive duty does not require general monitoring of all AI research, development, or commercial activity.
8. Article 3.1 does not govern attribution or aid-and-assistance responsibility under this Article. This Article applies to domestic and transnational conduct alike. Nothing in this Article authorises conduct otherwise prohibited by this Article on grounds of self-defence; measures lawfully taken under Article 3.2 remain subject to the prohibitions and protections of this Article.
9. The World Court is the competent forum for findings of state responsibility and for civil or regulatory liability of natural and legal persons under this Article. Proceedings shall provide timely notice of the allegations, access to the material evidence subject only to strictly necessary protective measures, adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, representation by counsel, an impartial hearing, a reasoned public decision subject to appeal or review under the Court's rules, and protection against compelled self-incrimination. A final finding under this Article requires clear and convincing evidence. Any criminal prosecution arising from the same conduct shall be brought only before a competent tribunal with applicable criminal jurisdiction and shall require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
10. Upon a final finding, the World Court may order cessation, non-repetition measures, preservation and disclosure of relevant evidence, removal or suspension of the offending system from operational use, victim compensation or a victim-reparation fund, disgorgement of proceeds directly derived from the violation, and proportionate compliance measures against a legal entity. Any remedy shall be necessary, proportionate, individualised, and subject to periodic review. A legal entity may be held liable where its governing body, senior management, or a person exercising effective operational control committed, authorised, or knowingly failed to prevent the violation while having the authority and duty to do so.
11. Where the World Court, a designated emergency duty panel of three judges, or the Security Council finds probable cause to believe that conduct prohibited by this Article is ongoing or presents an imminent risk of irreparable widespread or systematic civilian harm, it may order narrowly tailored interim measures, including preservation of evidence and temporary suspension of specified deployment, financing, operational support, or distribution. Interim measures shall be necessary to prevent the identified harm, shall not restrict protected expression or lawful civil uses beyond what is strictly necessary, and shall be reviewed by the World Court within 14 days and at intervals not exceeding 30 days thereafter.
Article 3.7
Upon a final World Court finding of aggression under Article 3.1, confirmed atrocity under Article 3.5, or WMD-related violation under Chapter 6, all member states shall automatically implement the non-kinetic measures listed in Article 4.9A to the extent applicable, without need for further SC or GA vote. The SC retains authority only for authorising kinetic enforcement, maritime interdiction involving force, or territorial operations.
1. Upon a final World Court finding of aggression under Article 3.1, a confirmed atrocity under Article 3.5, a final finding under Article 3.6, or a WMD-related violation under Chapter 6, all member states shall automatically implement the non-kinetic measures listed in Article 4.9A to the extent applicable and as specified by the World Court, without need for a further Security Council or People's Assembly vote.
2. For a final finding under Article 3.6, measures shall be limited to those necessary and proportionate to cease the violation, prevent its recurrence, preserve evidence, protect affected civilians, and secure reparations. Measures shall distinguish, where practicable, between responsible persons or entities and the general population; shall preserve humanitarian assistance and essential civilian services; and shall not be imposed solely on the basis of protected expression, association, research, or lawful civil AI activity.
3. The World Court shall specify the factual basis, scope, duration, and review conditions of measures under paragraph 2. Measures imposed following an Article 3.6 finding expire after 90 days unless renewed by the Court upon clear and convincing evidence that their continuation remains necessary and proportionate. Any affected state, person, or legal entity may seek expedited review of the scope or implementation of a measure.
4. The Security Council retains authority only for authorising kinetic enforcement, maritime interdiction involving force, or territorial operations. Nothing in this Article authorises kinetic enforcement, collective punishment, regime change, territorial annexation, or restrictions exceeding the limits of the final finding or applicable interim order.
Other changes
This instrument is designated World Law v0.1. References to version numbers in this preamble are for record-keeping only and carry no independent legal effect.
This instrument is designated World Law v0.2. References to version numbers in this preamble are for record-keeping only and carry no independent legal effect.
v0.1
This revision preserves the original instrument's narrow purpose—a binding minimum floor for catastrophic-risk prevention and a non-derogable rights core—while substantially reworking the enforcement, anti-entrenchment, AI, rights, climate, and representation architecture in response to critique. The central changes are these: (1) enforcement is no longer framed primarily as symbolic membership discipline; it now includes an automatic non-kinetic enforcement ladder applicable to member-state violations and, through pre-committed coalition obligations among ratifying states, to non-member actors and non-ratifying states that are found by the World Court to have committed core catastrophic-risk violations under Chapters 5 or 6; (2) AI governance is rewritten from a registry-centric model into a full-stack regime covering compute providers, chip manufacturers, cloud operators, model hosts, API gateways, fine-tuning services, downstream integrators, and frontier deployers, with pre-release liability and rapid incident reporting replacing any illusion of post-release recall of open weights; (3) anti-tyranny safeguards are made symmetric: renewal of coercive powers and catastrophic-risk chapters now expires automatically unless renewed by concurrent GA and PA supermajorities plus domestic ratification by a substantial fraction of member states, and repeal/devolution is made no harder than expansion; (4) liberty rights are hardened against abuse through culture, religion, or vague proportionality tests by elevating freedom of thought, conscience, belief, basic political participation, and equal civil status, and by expressly prohibiting coercive conversion, apostasy punishment, gender subordination, and identity-based exclusion; (5) climate obligations are converted from aspirational planning into a bounded but genuinely enforceable cross-border harm regime based on carbon-budget allocation, methane and land-use controls, adaptation duties, and automatic non-kinetic consequences after final World Court findings; (6) representation defects are reduced by imposing minimum electoral standards and independent monitoring for the People's Assembly, increasing its powers modestly, and replacing the prior arbitrary population cap with a transparent degressive proportionality formula; (7) vague standards are tightened with evidentiary thresholds, burden allocations, safe harbors, and explicit limits on agency interpretation; and (8) treaty interaction and supremacy are clarified: this law is supreme only within its enumerated catastrophic-risk and rights domains as between ratifying members, and incorporated external legal concepts are used only for the specific purposes expressly stated. The design still rejects a standing world army, police, prison, or general intelligence service, but it no longer relies on that rejection as an excuse for weak enforcement. It instead creates automatic economic, technological, and interoperability consequences, pre-committed civil protection obligations, and narrowly bounded interim measures for atrocity, WMD, and frontier-AI emergencies. The law remains honest that it cannot physically dominate the entire planet; it now does more to ensure that ratifying states cannot free-ride, defect cheaply, or shelter catastrophic-risk actors behind domestic law or non-membership.