改正履歴 — WORLD-LAW-001
v0.1
This revision preserves the original instrument's narrow purpose—a binding minimum floor for catastrophic-risk prevention and a non-derogable rights core—while substantially reworking the enforcement, anti-entrenchment, AI, rights, climate, and representation architecture in response to critique. The central changes are these: (1) enforcement is no longer framed primarily as symbolic membership discipline; it now includes an automatic non-kinetic enforcement ladder applicable to member-state violations and, through pre-committed coalition obligations among ratifying states, to non-member actors and non-ratifying states that are found by the World Court to have committed core catastrophic-risk violations under Chapters 5 or 6; (2) AI governance is rewritten from a registry-centric model into a full-stack regime covering compute providers, chip manufacturers, cloud operators, model hosts, API gateways, fine-tuning services, downstream integrators, and frontier deployers, with pre-release liability and rapid incident reporting replacing any illusion of post-release recall of open weights; (3) anti-tyranny safeguards are made symmetric: renewal of coercive powers and catastrophic-risk chapters now expires automatically unless renewed by concurrent GA and PA supermajorities plus domestic ratification by a substantial fraction of member states, and repeal/devolution is made no harder than expansion; (4) liberty rights are hardened against abuse through culture, religion, or vague proportionality tests by elevating freedom of thought, conscience, belief, basic political participation, and equal civil status, and by expressly prohibiting coercive conversion, apostasy punishment, gender subordination, and identity-based exclusion; (5) climate obligations are converted from aspirational planning into a bounded but genuinely enforceable cross-border harm regime based on carbon-budget allocation, methane and land-use controls, adaptation duties, and automatic non-kinetic consequences after final World Court findings; (6) representation defects are reduced by imposing minimum electoral standards and independent monitoring for the People's Assembly, increasing its powers modestly, and replacing the prior arbitrary population cap with a transparent degressive proportionality formula; (7) vague standards are tightened with evidentiary thresholds, burden allocations, safe harbors, and explicit limits on agency interpretation; and (8) treaty interaction and supremacy are clarified: this law is supreme only within its enumerated catastrophic-risk and rights domains as between ratifying members, and incorporated external legal concepts are used only for the specific purposes expressly stated. The design still rejects a standing world army, police, prison, or general intelligence service, but it no longer relies on that rejection as an excuse for weak enforcement. It instead creates automatic economic, technological, and interoperability consequences, pre-committed civil protection obligations, and narrowly bounded interim measures for atrocity, WMD, and frontier-AI emergencies. The law remains honest that it cannot physically dominate the entire planet; it now does more to ensure that ratifying states cannot free-ride, defect cheaply, or shelter catastrophic-risk actors behind domestic law or non-membership.